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Note

Burdick v. Takushi: The Anderson
Balancing Test to Sustain Prohibitions on
Write-In Voting
"The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of
the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that
right strike at the heart of representative government."'
I.

Introduction

The right to vote is unquestionably a fundamental right.2
However, the right to vote for the candidate of one's choice by
executing a write-in vote may not be similarly protected. 3 In
Burdick v. Takushi,4 the United States Supreme Court held
that a ban on write-in voting would be presumptively valid
when ballot access laws5 were constitutional, such that only
reasonable burdens were placed on the right to vote. 6 In that
context, any burden placed on the voter's rights would be reasonable and would be justified by the same interests that justi7
fied the ballot access laws.
In 1986, only one candidate from the petitioner's district
ran in the Hawaii State House of Representatives's primary
election.8 The petitioner, Burdick, did not want to vote for the
one unopposed candidate; rather, he sought to cast a write-in
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2063 (1992).
112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992).
See infra notes 295-305 and accompanying text.
Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2067.
Id.
Id. at 2061.
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vote. 9 Burdick was advised that Hawaii's election laws did not
allow write-in voting' o and filed suit in the Federal District
Court for the District of Hawaii challenging the election laws."
The issue presented in Burdick was whether Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting infringed on a citizen's constitutionally
protected right to vote.' 2 Central to this decision was the application of the analytical framework and the manner in which the
law would be evaluated.
Part II of this Casenote traces the history of voting in general, as well as the evolution of write-in voting. Additionally,
Part II examines the ballot access cases that preceded Burdick,
with special attention to the analysis used in Anderson v. Celebrezze.13 The development and refinement of the Anderson balancing test is traced through other ballot access cases to its
culmination in Burdick v. Takushi, the most recent ballot access case in which the Supreme Court applied this test. Part III
discusses the procedural history, and the majority and dissenting opinions of Burdick. Part IV analyzes the decision in Burdick and the analytical framework used by the Court to reach
its conclusion. Part V considers whether the statutory election
scheme of New York, which currently allows write-in voting,
could survive a constitutional challenge under Burdick if writein voting were prohibited. Part VI concludes that write-in voting is not a constitutionally protected right and asserts that future challenges to ballot access will be evaluated in the context
of the entire election laws of that state.
II.
A.

Background

General History of the Right to Vote

The United States Constitution gives states the power to
regulate procedures for elections.' 4 This allocation of power was
intentional as the framers of the Constitution believed that
each state should retain its own requirements for determining
9. Id.
10. Id.; see also infra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
11. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2061.
12. Id.
13. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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the qualifications of voters. 5 During the nation's early years,
only white males who also met other criteria such as owning
property, paying taxes, and attaining a minimum age were eligible to vote at the state level.' 6 Since that time, Congress has
acted to reduce the restrictions on the right to vote.
For example, the right to vote was extended to black men in
1870,17 and further extended to women in 1920.18 In 1964, the
Twenty-fourth Amendment was added to the Constitution to
prohibit the payment of a poll tax as a qualification to vote. 19
The Voting Rights Act of 196520 further protected the right to
vote by defining national standards 2' for the electoral process
and preventing the manipulation of election laws to disenfranchise voters in areas with low electoral participation. 22 The
Twenty-sixth Amendment, ratified in 1971, was the most recent
amendment to the Constitution concerning voting rights. This
amendment provided that individuals over eighteen years of
23
age could not be denied the right to vote because of their age.
In addition to congressional actions, the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court have reinforced the fundamental
nature of the right to vote 24 and to participate in the electoral
15. MARCHETTE CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
IN AMERICA, 1619-1850, at 252-57 (1969). Prior to drafting the Constitution, each
colony had ratified its own constitution. Id. at 185-236. Some of the colonies' constitutions included eligibility requirements for voting, while others relied on existing laws governing the qualifications of voters. Id.; see also Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973) (stating that the framers of the Constitution
intended the states to keep the power to regulate elections).

16.

BURT NEUBORNE

&

ARTHUR EISENBERG, THE RIGHTS OF CANDIDATES AND

19-20 (1980); see also CHUTE, supra note 15, at 252-57.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1; see also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that the requirement of paying a tax as a qualification to vote was unconstitutional).
20. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988)).
21. NEUBORNE & EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 89. National standards included the availability of absentee balloting for presidential elections and bilingual
ballots for linguistic minorities. Id; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-1(c), 1973b(f)(4)
(1988).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (1988); see also NEUBORNE & EISENBERG, supra
note 16, at 89-102. See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CWIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING
RIGHTS AcT (1965).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
24. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).

VOTERS
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process. 25 The right to vote is express in the Constitution and
its amendments, while the right to participate is protected by
the freedom of association. 26 Although freedom of association
was not explicit in the Bill of Rights, 27 the Supreme Court has
clearly stated that "[t]he right to associate with the political
party of one's choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom." 28 These guaranteed freedoms provide the basis
29
for the right to participate in elections by casting a vote.
B.

Evolution of Write-In Voting

The procedure for write-in voting dates back to the founding of this country.3 0 Until the late 1800s, elections were conducted using hand-written ballots. 31 Voters prepared their own
ballots or used color-coded, pre-printed ballots prepared by
political parties. 3 2 This essentially unregulated election process
led to widespread fraud and abuse during campaigns and elections. 33 Efforts by states to enhance the integrity of elections
led to the introduction of the secret ballot, known as the Austra25. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
26. Id. (stating that a voter has a "constitutionally protected right to participate in elections .... ."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 131, at 1062 (2d ed. 1988).
27. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (stating that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs derives from the First Amendment freedoms of speech and assembly, and is protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment); TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-26, at 1010 (explaining
that the Supreme Court has stated that the freedom of association derives from
the First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, petition, and assembly).
28. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973) (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 30 (1968)); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) ("[Tlhe right of
individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs... [is] protected
against federal encroachment .... ") (footnote omitted); see also JOHN E. NowAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.31(a), at 818-19 (4th ed. 1991)
(stating that the First Amendment freedom of association protects the right to participate in the electoral process).
29. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (stating that each voter has a
'constitutionally protected right to participate in elections . . . ."); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (stating that the Constitution guarantees
the right to vote and to have that vote counted).
30. See generally CHUTE, supra note 15.
31. L. E. FREDMAN, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN REFORM 20-22 (1968).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 22-24. Abuses included ballot box stuffing, bribery and intimidation. Id.
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lian ballot system.3 4 Under this system, states prepared a preprinted ballot from which voters selected candidates and then
confidentially deposited their ballots into a ballot box. 3 5 The
disadvantage of this new system was that it restricted voters'
choices to only those candidates whose names appeared on the
pre-printed ballot.3 6 To remedy this restriction, several state
37
courts validated the right to cast a write-in vote.
Currently, the election laws of thirty-five states, and the
38
District of Columbia, permit write-in voting in all elections.
39
Six states permit write-in voting at general elections only,
four states permit it in specific circumstances, 40 and five states,
34. See id. at 30-31. In 1888, Massachusetts was the first state to adopt a law
requiring the use of the Australian ballot system. Id. at 39. By 1892, 38 states
had adopted the Australian ballot system for use in their elections. Id. at 83; see
also JOHN H. WIGMORE, THE AusTRALLAN BALLOT SYSTEM 23-38, 50-57 (1889).
35. See FREDMAN, supra note 31, at 46-52, 83; see, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note
34, at 58-89 (discussing the Massachusetts act to implement the Australian ballot
system).
36. See FREDMAN, supra note 31, at 46.
37. See Patterson v. Hanley, 68 P. 821 (Cal. 1902); Sanner v. Patton, 40 N.E.
290 (Ill. 1895); Bowers v. Smith, 17 S.W. 761 (Mo. 1891); People v. Shaw, 133 N.Y.
493, 31 N.E. 512 (1892); Oughton v. Black, 61 A. 346 (Pa. 1905).
38. ALA. CODE § 17-8-5 (1987); ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.030(5) (Supp. 1993);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-448 (1984); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 7300-7304 (West Supp.
1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-1101 (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-373a
(West 1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4502 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1312(r)
(1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.061(3) (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-358
(Michie 1993); IDAHO CODE § 34-702A (Supp. 1993); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 10,
§ 5/18-9.1 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-11-7 (Burns 1993);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 49.31(4) (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-612 (1986); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 117.265 (Michie 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 601-602
(West 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 54, § 33E (1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 168.737(d) (West 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 115.439 (Vernon 1980) and § 115.453
(Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-12-208 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 656:12, :23 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:15-28 (West 1989); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 7104 (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-13-25 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3513.041 (Anderson 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 254.500 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 25, § 3063 (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-1380 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 2-7-117 (Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-7-20 (Supp. 1992); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2362, 2471 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.51.170 (West
Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 3-5-13, -6-2 (Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN § 7.50
(West 1986 & Supp. 1992); Wyo. STAT. §§ 22-6-119 - 22-6-120 (1992).
39. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-205 (Michie 1991); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 4D-1
(1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204B.36 (West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-151 (1991);
TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 146.001 (West 1986) and § 146.025 (West Supp. 1993); VA.
CODE ANN. § 24.2-644 (Michie 1993).
40. MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-365 (1990) (write-in voting is permitted in the
event that a candidate dies, resigns, withdraws or is removed from the ballot);
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including Hawaii, prohibit all write-in voting.41 The predecessor of the current Hawaii election law was enacted as a reform
measure to redress the abuses resulting from previously unregulated elections. 42
C. Equal Protection Challenges to States' Regulations of
Elections
The United States Constitution grants states the power to
govern their own elections. 43 As a practical matter, elections
must be regulated to ensure that they are conducted fairly and
honestly. 44 In our political process, a citizen has the opportunity to be a candidate, and to have his name printed on an election ballot, however, his ballot access may be subject to
reasonable requirements. 45 This state regulation of ballot access and elections, however, cannot violate the Equal Protection
46
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Early challenges to the ballot access provisions of states'
election laws were brought by candidates and/or parties as in§ 32-428 (1988) (write-in voting is permitted at primary elections
except for the offices of delegate to county convention, delegate to national convention, and director of public power district and at general elections for the offices of
President, Vice President, director of public power district, director of reclamation
district, member of board of education service unit, and director of natural resources district); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-19.1 (Michie 1991) (write-in voting permitted at general elections) and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-36.1 (Michie 1991) (write-in
NEB. REV. STAT.

voting permitted at primary elections for "any office voted upon by all voters of the
state"); Serpas v. Trebucq, 1 So. 2d 346 (La. Ct. App. 1941) (write-in candidates
must file a statement prior to the general election that they consent to be voted for,
however, a candidate who participated in a primary election is ineligible to become
a write-in candidate at the general election).
41. NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.270 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 7-127 (West
1991 & Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 17-19-31 (Supp. 1993); Chamberlin v. Wood,
88 N.W. 109, 109-10 (S.D. 1901) (write-in votes are not permitted since the Australian ballot law requires that all candidates be printed on the official ballot); see
infra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
42. Respondents' Brief at 9 n.8, Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992)
(No. 91-535) (citing L. E. FREDMAN, THE AusTRALIAN BALLOT: THE STORY OF AN
AMERICAN REFORM (1968)).
43. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
44. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
45. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968); see also Storer, 415 U.S. at 728
(stating that a state must provide feasible means for candidate to access the ballot); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 717 (1974) (finding that a state cannot limit
access based on economic factors).
46. Williams, 393 U.S. at 29.
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fringements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. 47 The challengers claimed that the laws restricted their
First Amendment freedom of association. 48 In deciding these
cases, the Supreme Court recognized that "the rights of voters
and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some
theoretical, correlative effect on voters."49 This was because restrictions on ballot access resulted in two types of constitutional
infringements: "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of ... voters ...

to

cast their vote effectively." 50 The rights of candidates and voters were further intertwined since "voters can assert their preferences only through candidates or parties .... "51 Because of
the close relationship between these rights, the Court has frequently considered the infringement of a supporter's right to
52
vote in situations restricting a candidate's access to the ballot.
47. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 959 (1982); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 178 (1979); American Party v.
White, 415 U.S. 767, 780 (1974); Storer, 415 U.S. at 727; Lubin, 415 U.S. at 710;
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 141 (1972); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 434
(1971); Williams, 393 U.S. at 26.
48. Clements, 457 U.S. at 971; Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 180;
American Party, 415 U.S. at 780; Storer, 415 U.S. at 727; Lubin, 415 U.S. at 710;
Jenness, 403 U.S. at 434; see also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)
(stating that the "freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .
49. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143.
50. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). The Supreme Court has found
that election laws that inhibited a candidate's ability to access the ballot had a
correspondingly restrictive effect on a voter's freedom to associate due to the
voter's inability to vote for the restricted candidate. See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143
(finding that the barriers to candidate access limited the choice of voters); see also
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1983); Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184;
Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716.
51. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184 (quoting Lubin v. Panish,
415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974)).
52. Id. (quoting Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716); Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716 (finding that
the right to vote was "heavily burdened" when a vote could only be cast for one of
two candidates when others sought ballot position); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144 (finding that the ballot access restriction posed a "real and appreciable impact" on voting because voters were substantially limited in their choice of candidates);
Williams, 393 U.S. at 30-31 (finding a heavy burden on the right of voters to cast
their vote effectively).

7
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In deciding the first ballot access cases, the Court formulated an analytical framework that survived for fifteen years.53
To determine whether an election law violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court applied strict scrutiny 54 with its attendant assessment of the availability of less drastic means to
achieve the states' interests 55 and considered three factors: the
circumstances behind the law, the interests that the state
claimed to be protecting, and the interests of those who were
disadvantaged by the denial of ballot access. 56
Several interests were frequently advanced by states to justify their restrictions on ballot access. These interests included:
protecting the integrity of the political process; 57 limiting the
number of candidates on the ballot to prevent voter confusion
and to ensure that the winner was the majority's choice; 58
53. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), was the first case challenging a
ballot access law that reached the United States Supreme Court. Kim A. Craddock, Comment, Write-In Voting: Whose Vote Is It Anyway?, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 311,
314-15 (1992).
54. Illinois State Bd.of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184 (requiring that the state
"establish that its classification is necessary to serve a compelling [state] interest"); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (strictly
scrutinizing ballot access laws to determine if they were "necessary to further compelling state interests"); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 147 (requiring that the ballot access
scheme be a "necessary or reasonable ...[means] for regulating the ballot"); Williams, 393 U.S. at 31 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (stating
that "only a compelling state interest ... can justify limiting First Amendment
freedoms")).
55. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 185; American Party v.
White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974); Lubin, 415 U.S. at 718; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 146;
Williams, 393 U.S. at 31-33.
56. Williams, 393 U.S. at 30.
57. American Party, 415 U.S. at 786 (asserting the interest of protecting the
"integrity of the nominating process"); Storer, 415 U.S. at 733 (asserting the state
policy of "maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot"); Lubin, 415
U.S. at 718 (finding that "maintaining the integrity of elections" is an important
and legitimate interest); Williams, 393 U.S. at 31-32 (state asserted the interest of
promoting the "two-party system in order to encourage compromise and political
stability").
58. Illinois State Bd.of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184-85 (explaining the state's
"legitimate interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot" and assuring the winner "'is the choice of a majority .... of those voting. . . . '"(quoting
Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145)); American Party, 415 U.S. at 781 (acknowledging "that
the State may limit each political party to one candidate for each office"); Lubin,
415 U.S. at 715 (asserting the state interest in keeping the ballot "within manageable, understandable limits"); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145 (asserting the state's interest to "avoid voter confusion, and assure that the winner is the choice of a
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preventing fraudulent or frivolous candidacies; 59 and, requiring
a preliminary showing of community support for the
60
candidate.
1. Challenged Ballot Access Laws That Were Upheld
In order to limit access in a manner consistent with the
state's interests, some states enacted election laws that specified the number of voters' signatures required on a candidate's
nominating petition. These laws were upheld, 61 even when restrictions were placed on the eligibility of the signers.6 2 In Jenness v. Fortson,6 3 the Court upheld a Georgia law that specified
the number of signatures required on a nonparty candidate's
nominating petition. 64 The law required that the petition be
signed by a number of voters that was equal to at least five percent of the total number of voters who were eligible to vote in
65
the last election for the office that the candidate was seeking.
In defense of the law, the Court recognized the state's interest
in requiring some preliminary showing of a "significant modimajority"); Williams, 393 U.S. at 33 (justifying ballot restrictions because "a large
number of parties might qualify for the ballot" resulting in voter confusion).
59. Lubin, 415 U.S. at 714 (defending the state's interest as "necessary to
keep the ballot from being overwhelmed with frivolous or... nonserious candidates"); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 145 (recognizing the state's interest in protecting the
"political process from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies").
60. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 185 (declaring that a state can
"require a preliminary showing of a 'significant modicum of support'" before printing a name on a ballot (quoting Jenness v. Forston, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971));
American Party, 415 U.S. at 782 (asserting the state interest that political parties
"demonstrate a significant, measurable quantum of community support" before appearing on the general election ballot); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442
(1971) (noting an important state interest in "requiring some preliminary showing
of a significant modicum of support" before printing the candidate's name on the
ballot in an effort to avoid voter confusion). Although the state interest of requiring preliminary support may have originally been asserted to achieve another interest, it has evolved into an independently asserted interest to justify ballot
access restrictions. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194
(1986).
61. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); American Party v. White, 415
U.S. 767 (1974).
62. American Party, 415 U.S. at 780-81 (upholding restrictions that included
signers not participating in another party's convention, and notarizing each
signature).
63. 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
64. Id. at 442.
65. Id. at 433.

9
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cum of support" before printing a candidate's name on the bal6
lot.

6

The Court found no abridgement of the candidate's right

to associate since the challenged law was no more burdensome
than two other available methods of ballot access. 67 The Court
held that the law did not impose restrictions on the ability of
voters to sign a candidate's nominating petition, and that this
adequately balanced the five percent signature requirement. 68
Overall, the Court noted that the statutory scheme for ballot
69
access did not "freeze the political status quo."

In a similar case, American Party v. White, 70 the Court upheld a Texas law that established qualifications for the signers
of nominating petitions. 7' The law stipulated that a voter was
ineligible to sign a candidate's nominating petition if that person had voted in another party's primary election. 72 In evaluating the law, the Court considered the state's interests in
limiting the number of candidates on the ballot, 73 requiring a
preliminary showing of community support, 74 and preserving
the integrity of the election. 75 The Court applied a strict level of
review76 and found that the candidate's freedom to associate
was not unduly burdened. 77 The Court further found that the
signature requirements were necessary to achieve the state's vital objectives78 and concluded that the state's interests could
66. Id. at 442. The Court found that this was an important state interest. Id.
67. Id. at 440-41. A candidate seeking a position on the ballot could compete
in the primary of a political party or file a nominating petition as an independent
candidate. Id. at 440.
68. Id. at 442.
69. Id. at 438 (noting that ballot access was not restricted to established
parties).
70. 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
71. Id. at 786-87.
72. Id. at 774 n.6. The Texas law required that minor party candidates, if the
party had not received two percent of the votes cast in the prior gubernatorial
election, file nominating petitions signed by the equivalent of one percent of the
votes cast in the prior gubernatorial election. Id. In addition, each signature on
the petition must be notarized. Id. at 787.
73. Id. at 781-82.
74. Id. at 782-85.
75. Id. at 786.
76. Id. at 780.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 780-81.
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not be equally well served by less burdensome means. 79 Therefore, the petition requirements, as well as the ballot access provisions in general, were found to be valid.80
Other types of restrictions on candidates' access to the ballot have also been upheld by the Supreme Court. In Storer v.
Brown,8 ' a California law required that an independent candidate not have a registered affiliation with a qualified political
party for one year prior to the primary election in which he
sought candidacy.8 2 The Court acknowledged the totality approach8 3 taken in other cases evaluating the constitutionality of
statutory schemes, but found it inapplicable where the single
disaffiliation requirement presented a total bar to an independent candidate.8 4 Applying a strict standard of review,8 5 the
Court found that the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of the electoral process 86 was compelling.8 7 This state interest outweighed the interests of a candidate, and his supporters,
to make a late, rather than early, decision for independent ballot status.88 Justice Brennan dissented because potential independent candidates were completely barred from
participating in the electoral process if they decided to enter the
race less than twelve months before the primary election.8 9
This could effectively prevent someone registered with a qualified political party from entering a race as an independent can79. Id. at 781. In addition, the Court determined that the election laws of-

fered minor party candidates a real and essentially equal opportunity to access the

ballot. Id. at 787-88.
80. Id. at 780-81.
81. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
82. Id. at 726.
83. Id. at 737. A "totality" approach is applicable when "a number of facially
valid provisions of election laws may operate in tandem to produce impermissible
barriers to constitutional rights." Id.
84. Here, the singular disaffiliation requirement is a total bar to candidacy.
Id.; see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34 (1968) (stating that the burden imposed on voting rights was the result of the totality of the ballot access scheme,
rather than a single requirement).

85. 415 U.S. at 736.
86. Id. at 733.
87. Id. at 736.
88. Id. The Supreme Court recognized that there must be a substantial regulation of elections to keep them fair and honest, id. at 730, and that an important
function of the primary election process was to "winnow out" all but the chosen
candidates. Id. at 735.
89. Id. at 757-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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didate. 90 He concluded that the disaffiliation requirement
burdened the rights of potential supporters to associate for
political purposes and to vote for the affected candidate. 91
In Clements v. Fashing,92 a similar law affecting candidates
which included resign-to-run and automatic resignation requirements was also upheld.9 3 The state asserted interests in
maintaining the integrity of the officeholder's present office and
avoiding the abuse or neglect of that office. 94 The Court departed from the pattern of strict scrutiny review and required
only a "rational predicate" to sustain the law. 95 It found that
the de minimis burden on potential candidates was justified by
the state's interests. 96 Justice Brennan stated in dissent that
the election laws infringed on the First Amendment rights of
candidates and voters, and that too little consideration was
97
given to the strict standard of review used in prior cases.
2.

Challenged Ballot Access Laws That Were Invalidated

The United States Supreme Court has struck down state
election laws that burdened First Amendment rights and were
not justified by the interests advanced by the state. For example, statutes that required a filing fee for nominating petitions,
as the sole indication of a candidate's seriousness, were invalidated where no alternate means of gaining access to the ballot
existed. In Lubin v. Panish98 a California election law required
a $700 filing fee, 99 and in Bullock v. Carter'0 0 a Texas law re90. Id. at 757.
91. Id. at 758. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, recognized that the state's interests were compelling, but he found that less drastic
means were available to achieve the state's interests. Id. at 760-62.
92. 457 U.S. 957 (1982) (plurality opinion).
93. Id. at 960-61. This Texas law required that certain officeholders complete
their current term of office before they could be eligible to run for the state legislature. Id.
94. Id. at 968.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 966-68.
97. Id. at 977 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan found no genuine justification for the classification and no meaningful relationship to the asserted state interests. Id. at 977-78.
98. 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
99. Id. at 710. This filing fee was required for candidates seeking the office of
county supervisor. Id.
100. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
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quired a $1424 filing fee. 10 ' In these cases, the Court found that
voters' rights were infringed because the filing fee requirement
limited their choice of candidates. 10 2 In each case, the Court
used a strict standard of review, 0 3 .and held that the filing fee
was not necessary to meet the states' objectives of maintaining
the integrity of the electoral process and regulating the number
04
of candidates on the ballot.
Although some signature requirements for nominating petitions have been upheld, 0 5 the Court has invalidated signature
requirements that were excessive or that varied based on the
office sought. In Williams v. Rhodes, 0 6 an Ohio law's signature
requirement, 10 7 along with other restrictions on ballot access,
made it virtually impossible for new party candidates to access
the ballot. 08 The Court found that these laws imposed severe
restrictions on the voters' rights to "cast their votes effectively"
and to associate for political purposes. 09 The Court evaluated
the ballot access laws in their totality"0 and considered the
state's asserted interests in encouraging political stability, ensuring that the winner was the majority's choice, and avoiding
voter confusion."' The Court held that these interests were not
101. Id. at 135-36. This fee was required for candidates seeking the office of
county commissioner. Id. Nominating petition filing fees for other offices ranged
up to $8900. Id. at 138 n.11.
102. Lubin, 415 U.S. at 715-16. The Court also focused on the impact of the
requirement on voters' rights. Id.; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144, 147. The Court considered the real and appreciable impact on voters. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144. In
both cases, the Court found that the right to vote was heavily burdened if a vote
was substantially limited by the choice of candidates. Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144.
103. Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144.
104. Lubin, 415 U.S. at 717-18; Bullock, 405 U.S. at 147. The Court found
there were alternative, less drastic means to test the seriousness of a candidate
without requiring a filing fee. Lubin, 415 U.S. at 718. These alternatives included
filing a nominating petition that demonstrated community support. Id. at 718-19.
105. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
106. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
107. Id. at 24-25. The law required that the candidate of a new political party
obtain signatures equalling 15% of the votes cast in the prior gubernatorial election. Id.
108. Id. at 25.
109. Id. at 30-32. The right to vote was heavily burdened when that vote
could only be cast for one of two candidates when other parties were seeking a
position on the ballot. Id. at 31.
110. Id. at 34; see supra note 83 for an explanation of the totality approach.
111. Williams, 393 U.S. at 31-34.
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compelling enough to justify the substantial burden placed on
112
the right to vote and the right to associate.
In Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers
Party,"3 an election law required a different number of signatures on the nominating petition depending on the office
sought." 4 Since voters express their political preferences by
selecting candidates, the Court found that the signature requirement burdened voters' rights to associate for the advance1 6
ment of political beliefs. 1 5 Using a strict standard of review,
the Court held that there were less drastic means to accomplish
the state's goals of limiting the number of candidates on the bal17
lot and assuring that the winner was the majority's choice."
The Court also found that there were no reasons to justify the
disparate treatment between local and statewide offices." 8
Although the Court had always examined the interests of
those who were directly disadvantaged by the ballot access law,
that is, candidates, only half of these ballot access cases considered the impact on the voter. When the Court had considered
the impact on the voters' rights, it consistently found a significant burden on the right to vote. 119
112. Id. at 31-33.

113. 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
114. Id. at 175-76. This law applied to both new party and independent candidates. Id. The result of this requirement was that a petition for a local office, such
as Mayor of Chicago, required more signatures than for a statewide office. Id. at
176-77.
115. Id. at 184 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)). The Court
found that voters' ability to express their political preferences was impaired. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 186. The Court suggested that the more stringent requirement for
cities than for suburbs, and limiting the geographic area from which signatures
could be obtained, were not the least drastic means of meeting the state's objectives. Id. at 186-87.
118. Id. at 187.
119. Id. at 184 (finding the right to vote was burdened because "voters can
assert their preferences only through candidates or parties or both" (quoting Lubin
v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974))); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974)
(citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968)) (stating that the right to vote
was "heavily burdened" if a vote could only be cast for one of two candidates when
"other candidates are clamoring for a place on the ballot"); Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134, 144 (1972) (finding that the ballot access restriction presented a "real
and appreciable impact" on voters because they were "substantially limited in
their choice of candidates").
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3. Voters' Challenges to Election Laws
In these cases, the challenged election laws established specific deadlines that affected a voter's ability to participate in a
primary election. In Kusper v. Pontikes,120 the Court struck an
Illinois law that prohibited a voter from participating in a
party's primary election if that voter had participated in a different party's primary election within the preceding twentythree month period. 121 This requirement deprived a voter of the
ability to choose another party's candidate, and substantially
abridged his ability to associate with another political party
during that twenty-three month period. 122 The Court used a
strict standard of review 123 and held that the state's interest in
protecting the integrity of the electoral process 124 did not justify
preventing voters from exercising their constitutional right to
associate. 125

A similar New York law was upheld in Rosario v. Rockefeller.' 26 There, the law required a voter to register with a political
party at least eleven months prior to the party's primary election. 27 The Supreme Court found that this requirement did not
burden a voter's rights, it merely imposed a time deadline for
enrollment with a political party. 28 The Court held that the
law accomplished the state's purposes of preventing party raiding 29 and preserving the integrity of the electoral process, and
120. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
121. Id. at 61. The effect of this law required a voter to register with a political party 23 months prior to its primary election and not to participate in the
primaries of any other parties. Id. at 57.
122. Id. at 58. The law restricted the voter's freedom to change party affiliation and served to "lock" the voter into a preexisting party affiliation for a substantial period of time. Id. at 57.
123. Id. at 59-61. The State must choose the least drastic means to achieve a
legitimate state interest. Id. at 61.
124. Id. at 59-60. The state sought to protect the electoral process by curtailing party raiding. Id. Party raiding occurs when voters who are sympathetic to
a particular candidate vote for a weaker candidate in another party's primary in
order to give their favored candidate a better opportunity to win in the general
election. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 13-24, at 1122; see also Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410
U.S. 752, 760 (1973).
125. Kusper, 414 U.S. at 61.
126. 410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973).
127. Id. at 760.
128. Id. at 757. Under this law, a voter could vote in a different party primary
each year as long as he met the enrollment deadline. Id. at 759.
129. See supra note 124.
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that these ends could not have been effectively achieved by
other means. 130 In dissent, Justice Powell noted that the law
imposed a substantial and unnecessary restriction on these particular petitioners since they were previously unaffiliated with
any political party. 131 Employing strict scrutiny, he found that
the state's interest was not substantial enough to justify the
burden 132 and that there were less drastic means available to
133
protect the state's asserted interests.
D. The Court's Considerationof Write-In Voting Provisions
Although some of the election laws that were challenged allowed write-in voting, 34 these provisions were not prominent in
the Court's analysis. In Williams,135 the Supreme Court simply
affirmed the district court's order that write-in voting be extended to the general election to remedy the restrictions placed
on a new party's access to the ballot. 136 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Douglas noted, however, that the availability of write-in
37
votes was "no substitute for a place on the ballot."
In Lubin,138 the Court noted that write-in candidates were
also required to pay a filing fee. 139 The Court suggested that
allowing write-in candidates to receive votes, without the filing
130. Rosario, 410 U.S. at 760-62.
131. Id. at 763 (Powell, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 770.
133. Id. at 770-71. The dissent noted that other states have shorter enrollment deadlines that have not adversely impacted on party structure. Id. at 771.
The dissent noted, without reaching the issue, the petitioner's argument that less
drastic means could include loyalty oaths, limitations for voters with pre-existing
party affiliations, and criminal sanctions for fraudulent participation in electoral
activities. Id. at 771 n.13.
134. American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 772 n.3 (1974); Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724, 736 n.7 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 710-11 (1974); Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137 n.6 (1972); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 434
(1971); Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 290 F. Supp. 983, 986 (S.D. Ohio), affd in
part, modified in part sub nom., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (permitting write-in voting in primary elections only).
135. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
136. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34 (1968). A write-in ballot would allow
an individual to effectively exercise the right to vote. Socialist Labor Party v.
Rhodes, 290 F. Supp. 983, 986-87 (S.D. Ohio), affd in part, modified in part sub
nom., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
137. Williams, 393 U.S. at 37 (Douglas, J., concurring).
138. See supra notes 98-99 & 102-04 and accompanying text.
139. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 710-11 (1974).
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fee, could present an alternative to the filing fee requirement.140
Yet, the Court acknowledged that ballot access through write-in
votes "falls far short of access" comparable to having a name
printed on the ballot. 14 1 In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun would accept write-in voting as a remedy to the ballot access restriction imposed on candidates. 4 2 In Bullock, 4 3 the
Texas law did not permit write-in votes at primary elections,44
therefore, write-in votes were not considered as an alternative
method of acquiring votes.
The Georgia law challenged in Jenness 45 also permitted
write-in voting. 146 There, the Court mentioned the availability
of write-in votes only to emphasize that the challenged signature requirement applied to nonparty candidates. 147 The Court
did not consider write-in voting in its analysis of the case. The
provision for write-in voting in American Party48 was similarly
disregarded as the Court merely mentioned the existence of the
provision in a footnote. 49 The opinions in the other cases discussed above did not mention write-in voting.
E. A Shift to FirstAmendment Analysis
Anderson v. Celebrezze,150 decided in 1983, marked the end
of the Supreme Court's use of equal protection analysis to assess ballot access laws. 15 ' The Court stated that it relied on
past opinions that evaluated ballot access laws under "the 'fundamental rights' strand of equal protection analysis." 5 2 The
balancing test developed in Anderson, however, only considered
140. Id. at 719 n.5.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 722 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun speculated,
however, that the majority would reject write-in votes as a viable alternative. Id.
at 723.
143. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
144. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137 (1972).
145. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
146. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 434 (1971).
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
149. American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 772 n.3 (1974).
150. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
151. Id. at 786 n.7.
152. Id. See generally TRIBE, supra note 26, § 16-7, at 1454 (stating that classifications that result in infringements on fundamental rights are strictly
scrutinized).
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the infringement of rights protected by the First and Four153
teenth Amendments.
In Anderson, an independent presidential candidate challenged an Ohio law that required the filing of a nominating petition by March 20 to qualify for the upcoming November general
election. 5 4 The Court stated that its primary concern was the
impact that ballot access restrictions placed on the rights of voters. 155 The Court reiterated that the right to associate for the
advancement of political beliefs and the right to cast votes effectively were fundamental freedoms. 156 The Court stated, however, that not all restrictions on candidates' access to the ballot
impose unconstitutional burdens on voters' rights. 1 57 Here, the
petitioner claimed that the early filing deadline was an unconstitutional burden on the voting and associational rights of his
supporters. 158
The Anderson Court developed a balancing test to consider
challenges to the constitutionality of state ballot access laws. 5 9
First, the Court must "consider the character and magnitude of
the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." 60 Second, the Court "must identify
and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as
justifications for the burden imposed by [the law]."' 6 1 Third, in
weighing the rights burdened and the state's interest, the Court
153. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 n.7. The prior cases applying the fundamental
rights strand of equal protection analysis focused on the infringement of rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which resulted in classifications that restricted a candidate's
access to the ballot. Id.
154. Id. at 782-83. Anderson's supporters filed the requisite nominating petition and statement of candidacy approximately seven weeks after the statutory
deadline. Id. at 782.
155. Id. at 786.
156. Id. at 787.
157. Id. at 788. The Court stated that reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions were generally sufficient to justify a state's important regulatory interests.
Id. The Court cited Jenness,American Party, and Storer as examples of "generally
applicable and evenhanded restrictions" on ballot access that were upheld by the
Court. Id. at 788 n.9.
158. Id. at 782.
159. Id. at 789. The Court stated that constitutional challenges to election
laws must be resolved through the analytical process used in ordinary litigation.
Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss3/4

18

19941

BURDICK v. TAKUSHI

967

"also must consider the extent to which those [state] interests

1 62
make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights."
Applying this balancing test, the Court first considered the
nature of the injury to voters' rights by evaluating the impact of
the total ballot access scheme on all candidates. 163 The Court
found that the filing deadline placed a particular burden on Anderson's supporters because it infringed on their ability to associate for political purposes since they could not vote for him as
an independent candidate. 64 The Court noted that the early filing deadline imposed an additional burden on the organizing
efforts of an independent candidate since his positions on the
issues must be established several months before the major parties have announced their platforms. 165 Since the major political parties do not select candidates or solidify party platforms
until their conventions are held in the summer, they have more
flexibility to respond to changing political sentiments. 66 An independent candidate, however, does not have the same flexibility since his candidacy, and appeal to supporters, must begin
nearly five months before the major parties hold their conventions. 67 The Court concluded that a ballot access requirement
which differentiated based on the type of candidate seeking ballot access resulted in a particular burden on voters. 68
Applying the second part of the balancing test, the Court
considered the "legitimacy" of each interest asserted by the
state to justify the early filing deadline. 6 9 The state first asserted the interest in fostering an informed and educated electorate. 7 0 While the Court found that this was an "important and

162. Id.
163. Id. at 790-92.
164. Id. at 792. The Court acknowledged that those individuals who supported Anderson as an independent candidate were readily identifiable. Id.
165. Id. at 791.
166. Id. at 790-91.
167. Id. at 791. The Court noted that, under Ohio's law, a late candidate who
could potentially attract wide voter support would be precluded from entering the
race. Id. at 792.
168. Id. at 792-93.
169. Id. at 796.
170. Id.
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legitimate" interest, it did not justify a mandated seven-month
period, preceding the election, to educate voters. 171
Another interest advanced by the state was that of ensuring equal treatment among all candidates. 172 Although a party
candidate participating in a primary election must declare his
candidacy at the same time as an independent candidate, the
Court noted that the consequences were different for these
types of candidates. 73 A party's presidential candidate could
still appear on the general election ballot, even if he had not
participated in the primary election, yet an independent candidate would be precluded from participating in the general election if he had not filed a statement of candidacy before the
March deadline. 174 The Court concluded that the interest of
treating all candidates equally was not achieved by requiring
all candidates to file nominating petitions in March. 175
The final interest advanced by the state was to promote
political stability by "protecting the two major parties from
'damaging intraparty feuding." ' 176 The Court determined that
this interest was actually an attempt to reduce external competition for the established political parties. 77 Moreover, the
Court stated that the deadline was "not precisely drawn" to promote political stability since the requirement applied to all independent candidates regardless of prior party affiliations, 78

171. Id. at 796-97. The Court stated that advances in telecommunications
and increased literacy levels among the general population indicated that seven
months was excessive to ensure that voters would be informed and educated regarding the choice of candidates. Id. at 797.
172. Id. at 799.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 801.
176. Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 41, Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780 (1983) (No. 81-1635)). The state asserted that Anderson's decision to run as an
independent candidate threatened the internal organization of the Republican
Party. Id.
177. Id. The Court relied on Williams, and noted that voters' rights were outweighed by the state's attempts to protect established political parties. Id. at 802.
178. Id. at 805. The Court noted that the filing deadline could actually serve
to defeat the state's interest since an early deadline would encourage minor candidates to compete with an existing party as an independent candidate rather than
influence the party's views through internal mechanisms. Id.
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and concluded that the early filing deadline did not promote
179
political stability.
The Ohio election law challenged in Anderson allowed
write-in votes for independent candidates. 180 The Court stated,
however, that the availability of write-in votes would not cure
the restriction on ballot access since write-in votes were "not an
adequate substitute for having the candidate's name appear on
the printed ballot."' 8l
The Court ultimately held that the burdens placed on voters' freedom of choice and association outweighed the state's
"minimal" interest in requiring an early filing deadline. 8 2
Clearly, the Court was engaged in a balancing analysis, yet it
was unclear if the Court intended to strictly scrutinize the ballot access restriction. 8 3 In evaluating the nature and extent of
the infringement on voters' rights, the Court found that the ballot access laws resulted in a particularburden on the rights of
Anderson's supporters,M but did not characterize this burden
in terms generally associated with strict scrutiny analysis. The
Court's recognition that an independent candidate could be excluded from the ballot 8 5 suggested that the burden was severe.
In applying the second prong of the Anderson balancing
test, the Court did not require the state to advance a compelling
or important interest to outweigh the burden imposed.8 6 The
Court required that the burden be justified by a legitimate state
179. Id. The Court noted that although a party candidate may not have participated in a primary election, he could still achieve ballot status in the general
election. Id.
180. Id. at 799 n.26.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 806.
183. Terry Smith, Election Law: Election Laws and FirstAmendment Freedoms - Confusion and Clarificationby the Supreme Court, 1988 ANN. SURV. Am.L.
597, 600 n.19.
184. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792. The Court also noted that an unequal burden
on independent candidates would infringe on a voter's freedom of association. Id.
at 793-94.
185. Id. at 790.
186. See TRIBE, supra note 26, § 13-20, at 1108 n.47. Although the Court
claimed to be relying on prior ballot access cases in developing the balancing test
applied in Anderson, there was no mention in the Court's opinion of the need for a
compelling state interest or least restrictive alternative. Id.
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interest. 187 Although the last portion of the balancing test purports to examine the extent to which the state's interest makes
it necessary to burden the voters' rights, this analysis was not
undertaken because the interests advanced by the state did not
justify the burden.
The Court's analysis suggested that the Anderson balancing test did not rise to the level of strict scrutiny because it did
not require a compelling state interest to justify the severe burden imposed by the early filing deadline. 188 Following the
Court's decision in Anderson, commentators reached conflicting
conclusions regarding the impact of the balancing test on subsequent challenges to ballot access laws. 189 Subsequent applications of the balancing test reveal its durability in the resolution
of ballot access cases and evince the evolution of a strict scrutiny component.
1. Supreme Court Applications of the Anderson
Balancing Test
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party'90 was the first ballot access case to reach the Supreme Court after Anderson, yet
neither the majority, nor the dissent, applied the Anderson balancing test. In Munro, the Supreme Court upheld a Washington state law that imposed restrictions on a minor party's
187. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-89. Further, the restriction must be narrowly
tailored to achieve the state's legitimate interest. Id. at 806.
188. See Smith, supra note 183, at 610.
189. Thomas S. Chase, Case Comment, ConstitutionalLaw - Early Filing
Deadline Unconstitutional;A Trend Toward Strict Scrutiny in Ballot Access Cases,
18 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 24, 30-31 (1984) (contending that ballot access restrictions
on candidates would not be subject to strict scrutiny analysis under Anderson);
Teresa L. Grigsby, Note, Anderson v. Celebrezze: The Ascendancy of the First
Amendment in Ballot Access Cases, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 363, 396-99 (1983) (speculating that the analysis used in Anderson may not be applied in future cases in
favor of an individual case-by-case analysis); Lloyd E. Selbst, Casenote, State Restrictions on CandidateAccess to the Ballot in PresidentialElections, 25 B.C. L.
REV. 1117, 1136-38 (1984) (arguing that Anderson created different levels of strict
scrutiny analysis for challenges to ballot access restrictions imposed on national
and statewide elections); Kurt Wittenberg, Recent Cases, Anderson v. Celebrezze:
Ballot Access and the Due Process Clause - An Alternative to Equal Protection
Analysis, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 411, 420, 426-27 (1984) (arguing that the Court actually applied strict scrutiny and did not provide adequate guidelines for the resolution of future ballot access cases).
190. 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
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ability to access the general election ballot.191 The law, passed
in 1977, required that a minor party candidate receive at least
one percent of the votes cast in the primary election to secure a
192
position on the general election ballot.
The Court reiterated that ballot access restrictions could
infringe on the rights of individuals to associate for political
purposes. 93 The challenged provision was found to affect the
rights of "voters to cast their votes effectively" and could
thereby render the restriction unconstitutional.'9 4 The Court
noted, however, that voters were not restricted in their ability
to make choices and concluded that their freedom of association
was not infringed merely because the voters were required to
express their preferences at primary elections. 195 Rather than
fashioning a precise standard of review, 196 the Court compared
the one percent requirement to the restrictions challenged in
prior ballot access cases. 197 The Court found that the infringement on First Amendment rights was slight and did not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation in light of the more severe
restrictions that were upheld in other cases.' 9
The state advanced the interest in requiring candidates to
show community support before printing their names on the
191. Id. at 191.
192. Id. at 191-92. The minor party candidate challenging the law received
approximately nine one-hundredths of one percent of the total votes cast and was
denied a position on the general election ballot. Id. at 192.
193. Id. at 193.
194. Id. (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)).
195. Id. at 199. The minor party asserted that the ballot access restriction
posed severe burdens on First Amendment rights. Id. at 196. The challengers
based their position on the fact that only one minor party candidate had qualified
for the general election ballot since the enactment of the one percent requirement.
Id. at 196-97. They also sought to distinguish their case from prior cases concerning signature requirements since obtaining votes at a primary election was more
difficult. Id. at 197. The Court found that the difference between these two methods of demonstrating community support was not of constitutional significance.
Id.
196. See also Smith, supra note 183, at 617.
197. Munro, 479 U.S. at 200 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall
noted that the majority did not articulate the standard of review applied in this
case. Id.
198. Munro, 479 U.S. at 199. The Court found that the restriction did not
pose an "insuperable barrier" to minor parties seeking to access the general election ballot. Id. at 197. The Court also stated that the restriction in this case was
less severe than the requirements that had been upheld previously in Jenness and
American Party. Id. at 199.
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general election ballot. 199 The Court simply reaffirmed its holdings in Jenness and American Party that a state can require a
candidate to make a "'preliminary showing of substantial [community] support"' as a prerequisite to ballot status. 20 0 The
Court held that the ballot access restriction would be upheld
since the slight burden posed by the one percent requirement
20 1
was related to the state's asserted interest.
Justice Marshall, in dissent, stated that the standard of review to be applied in ballot access cases was readily apparent: a
law "that burden[ed] minor-party access to the ballot must be
necessary to further a compelling state interest, and must be
narrowly tailored to achieve that goal." 20 2 In applying this
standard, he found that the law imposed an excessive burden on
20 3
the associational rights of minor parties and their supporters.
Since the ballot access law burdened First Amendment rights,
it had to be strictly scrutinized. 20 4 Justice Marshall concluded
that the one percent requirement was not even rationally related to the state's interest, and therefore, could not pass consti20 5
tutional muster.
After Munro, the analytical framework to be applied in ballot access cases remained unclear. 20 6 The Munro Court stated
that infringements on voters' rights may not survive strict scrutiny, 20 7 yet it did not apply that standard. The dissent similarly
advocated using strict scrutiny analysis 20 8 and found that the
requirement could not survive. 20 9 Nonetheless, neither the ma199. Id. at 194. The Court accepted the state legislature's rationale that the
one percent requirement would reduce the number of candidates thereby alleviating the difficulty created by an overcrowded general election ballot. Id. at 196.
200. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)). The
Court further stated that it has never required a state to prove actual voter confusion or frivolous candidacies as a prerequisite to requiring a showing of community
support. Id. at 194-95.
201. Id. at 199.
202. Id. at 201 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Illinois State Bd. of Elections
v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979)).
203. Id. at 202-03. Justice Marshall found that the statute essentially excluded minor party candidates from general elections. Id.
204. Id. at 205.
205. Id. at 204-05.
206. See Smith, supra note 183, at 621-22.
207. Munro, 479 U.S. at 193.
208. Id. at 201 (Marshall J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 205.
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jority, nor the dissent, employed the balancing test formulated
in Anderson.
In Tashjian v. Republican Party,210 a voters' rights case
that was decided the same day as Munro, the Supreme Court
applied the Anderson balancing test. In Tashjian, the Supreme
Court struck down a Connecticut law that required voters who
participated in a primary election to be registered members of
that party. 21 ' This law conflicted with a Republican Party of
Connecticut rule that allowed independent voters to vote in a
212
Republican Party primary.
To evaluate this law, the Court applied the balancing test
developed in Anderson.21 3 Under the first part of the test, the
Court examined the impact of the requirement in the context of
the Party's other activities within the electoral process. 21 4 The

Court determined that the Party's First Amendment freedom to
associate with others was infringed. 215 The Court concluded

that the law limited the Party's associational opportunities "at
the crucial juncture" when political power could be achieved
21 6
through the consolidation of common beliefs.
In applying the second part of the Anderson balancing test,
the Court evaluated each of the interests asserted by the state
to be compelling. 21 7 The state first asserted that the law prevented party raiding.218 The Court noted that although this had
been recognized as a legitimate state interest, it was not impli210. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
211. Id. at 210-11, 229. This is also known as the closed primary system. See
id. at 222 n.11.
212. Id. at 210, 212. For purposes of this discussion, the Republican Party
will be referred to as the Party.
213. Id. at 214 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). The
Court must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to First
Amendment rights against the precise interest advanced by the state to justify the
burden. Id. In weighing the rights burdened and the state's interest, the Court
must also consider the extent to which the state interests make it necessary to
burden the protected rights. Id.
214. Id. at 215.
215. Id. at 214. The Party argued that the law burdened the rights of its
members to decide with whom they could associate for political purposes and inhibited their ability to broaden their base of public support. Id.
216. Id. at 216. Although the Court did not precisely characterize the nature
of the burden, it suggested that the burden was severe since the law interfered
with the Party's basic function of selecting political candidates. See id. at 215-16.
217. Id. at 217.
218. Id. at 219; see supra note 124.
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cated in this case. 219 The Court stated that other provisions of
the election law actually facilitated party raiding 220 and therefore, this interest could not be advanced to justify the exclusion
221
of voters from a party primary.
The state also argued that the closed primary system 222 advanced the interest of avoiding voter confusion since the public
could be misled by a Republican general election candidate who
was not selected solely by Republican voters. 223 The Court
noted that the Party employed other mechanisms to ensure that
a general election candidate conformed to the Party's platform. 224 The Court concluded that the burden imposed was not

"necessary" to ensure that voters understood the ideological be225
liefs of general election candidates.
The third interest advanced by the state was that of protecting both "the integrity of the two-party system and the responsibility of party government." 226 The state supported this
interest since it protected "the integrity of the Party against the
Party itself."227 The Court concluded that it was not within the
state's role to interfere with the Party's internal management. 228 The Court held that the interests advanced by the
219. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 219. The Court acknowledged that the state interest in preventing party raiding was found to be legitimate in Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) and Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
220. Tashian, 479 U.S. at 219. The Connecticut election law permitted independent voters to register with a party as late as the day before a primary election. Id. Under this provision, a raid could be organized by independent voters "at
the 11th hour." Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 211 n.1. In a closed primary, only voters who are registered members of the party may vote in the election. Id.
223. Id. at 220.
224. Id. at 221. In order for a candidate to be listed on the primary election
ballot, he must have obtained 20% of the votes cast at the Party's convention. Id.

at 220. In addition, given the strength of the independent vote in Connecticut, the
Party rule allowed the Party to ascertain independent voters' preferences for a
general election candidate. Id. at 221.

225. Id. at 220-22.
226. Id. at 222. The state argued that its restriction on primary election voters promoted "responsiveness by elected officials and strengthen[ed] the effective-

ness of the political parties." Id. It also argued that the law was designed to
protect the Party from "conduct destructive of its own interests." Id. at 224.
227. Id. The Court noted that this state interest addressed the internal operations of the Party and would prevent the Party from managing its own internal
affairs. Id.
228. Id.
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state were "insubstantial," and that the law, as applied to the
229
Party, was unconstitutional.
The TashjianCourt's application of the Anderson balancing
test did not provide conclusive guidance as to whether or not
the balance rose to the level of strict scrutiny. The Court's finding of a burden "at the crucial juncture" when the Party could
assert its political influence 230 suggested a substantial burden
on the Party's associational rights. The Court, however, did not
explicitly require a compelling state interest to sustain the law.
Applying the second part of the Anderson balancing test,
the Court found that the state's interests were insubstantial. 23 '
As a result, the final consideration of the Anderson balance,
that is, the extent to which the state's interest in avoiding voter
confusion made it necessary to burden the rights, was a gratuitous addition to the analysis. 23 2
Although the Court never stated that it was applying strict
scrutiny, the decision was consistent with the application of a
strict standard of review. This is because the law would still
have been stricken under heightened scrutiny since the interests advanced by the state were insubstantial. 233 The subsequent case of Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Committee23 4 supports the position that the Court applied strict
scrutiny in Tashjian. In Eu, the Court cited Connecticut's assertion of a compelling interest to support the use of a strict
standard of review. 235 Thus, the Court apparently believed that
it had applied strict scrutiny in Tashjian, even though it was
not readily apparent from that opinion.
The Eu Court applied the Anderson balance, and explicitly
included strict scrutiny analysis.236 In Eu, a California law that
prohibited the official governing body of a political party from
229. Id. at 225.
230. Id. at 216.
231. Id. at 225.
232. Although the Court explicitly stated that the interest in avoiding voter
confusion did not make it necessary to infringe on protected rights, id. at 221-22,
this may have been another way for the Court to express its finding that the state
interest was not substantial.
233. Id. at 225.
234. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
235. Id. at 222 (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986)).
236. Id.
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endorsing or supporting its own candidates in primary elections
was invalidated. 23 7 The Court's analytical framework consisted
of the first part of the Anderson balancing test to determine the
nature and extent of the burden imposed by the law. 238 If the
law was found to burden First Amendment rights, the Court
stated that it could survive constitutional scrutiny "only if the
State shows that it advances a compelling state interest."2 9 In
addition, the law must be "narrowly tailored to serve that
240
interest."
Applying the first part of the Anderson test, the Court examined the impact of the restriction on the Party's ability to
participate in the electoral process and associate politically with
its members. 24 1 The Court found that the prohibition on endorsements "directly hamper[ed]" a supporter's ability to learn
of the party's views with respect to its candidates. 242 The Court
found a clear restraint on associational rights and concluded
243
that the law "suffocated" these rights.
Because the prohibition burdened the party's free association, the state was required to establish that it served a compelling interest. 244 The first interest advanced by the state was to
promote a stable government. 245 The Court conceded that this
was a compelling state interest, however, the state did not show
that banning party endorsements was related to a stable government. 246 The state further argued that party stability was
237. Id. at 216.
238. Id. at 222 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
239. Id. (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 217, 222 (1986);
Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979);
American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780 & n.ll (1974); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 31 (1968)).
240. Id. (citing Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 185; Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972)).
241. Id. at 223.
242. Id. The Court also noted that the prohibition was an attempt to censor
the party's political speech. Id. at 223-24. The Court stated that the endorsement
prohibition prevented parties from "promoting candidates 'at the crucial juncture
at which the appeal to common principles may be translated into concerted action'." Id. at 224 (quoting Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 216).
243. Id. at 224-25.
244. Id. at 225.
245. Id. at 225-26. The state argued that the prohibition served this interest
since endorsements of specific candidates may create intraparty friction resulting
in the party's defeat at the general election. Id. at 227.
246. Id. at 226.
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an aspect of ensuring a stable government. 247 The Court was
not persuaded that the interest of preserving the party's stability during a primary election campaign was as compelling as
248
promoting a stable government.
The second state interest asserted was the protection of
voters from confusion and undue influence. 249 Although the
Court acknowledged that fostering an informed electorate was a
legitimate state interest, 250 the Court was suspicious of a law
that resulted in a restraint of information to ensure informed
decision making by voters. 251 The Court concluded that the interest of avoiding confusion and undue influence was not
achieved by prohibiting a party from endorsing its own candidates. 252 Because the state failed to assert a compelling interest
to justify prohibiting party endorsements, the Court held that
the law was unconstitutional. 253 Thus, Eu conclusively established that election laws may be subjected to strict scrutiny
analysis. The second part of the Anderson balancing test was
effectively replaced with strict scrutiny review. This indicated
that the first part of the Anderson balancing test may be a
threshold test to determine if the analysis continued with the
second part of Anderson, or was replaced with strict scrutiny.
The next ballot access case to reach the Supreme Court
suggested that the Anderson balancing test was indeed a
threshold test to trigger strict scrutiny analysis, although that
analysis was not applied to the facts of the case. In Norman v.
Reed, 254 the Court struck down an Illinois law that required
new party candidates to obtain more signatures for ballot status
in local elections than for statewide elections. 255 In establishing
247. Id. at 227.
248. Id. at 227-28. In fact, the Court responded that a purpose of primary
elections is to finally settle disputes between competing factions within the party.
Id. at 227.
249. Id. at 228.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 228-29.
252. Id. at 229.
253. Id.
254. 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992).
255. Id. at 708. The law required new parties to gather 25,000 signatures on
nominating petitions from each district within a political subdivision to enter a
candidate in an election for an office from that subdivision. Id. at 702. The effect
of this law required a new party, which was establishing itself in a multi-district
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the analytical framework, the Court cited to Anderson and
stated that a ballot access restriction must be justified by a
state interest that is "sufficiently weighty" to sustain the law. 256
The Court further required that a "severe restriction... be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling
257
importance."
The Court identified the burdened rights as the right of individuals to associate together as a new political party and the
right of voters to express their views through favored candidates. 258 The Court, however, did not characterize the degree of
the burden imposed by the nominating petition signature requirement. The state asserted that its interest in requiring
electoral support in each political subdivision voting for a local
office was sufficient to sustain the law. 259
Before considering the interest advanced by the state, the
Court reviewed its earlier decision in Illinois State Board of
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party260 which concerned the
predecessor to the law challenged here. 26 1 Based on that decision, and an examination of the current ballot access laws, the
Court concluded that the state could not require more signatures on a nominating petition for a local office than for a statewide office. 262 The Court simply held that the signature
requirement was not "the most narrowly tailored means" of

subdivision, to obtain more signatures than were required for a statewide office.
Id. at 707; cf Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S.
173 (1979).
256. Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 705 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
789 (1983)).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. The Court considered this state interest since it was not raised in the
earlier case as a basis for sustaining the ballot access scheme. Id. at 707-08.
260. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text. The Illinois State Legislature's response to the Court's decision in that case was to amend the statute by
capping the required number of signatures from a political subdivision at 25,000.
Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 707.
261. Id. at 707. The Court noted that the law remained "flawed" since the
number of signatures required for some political offices still required more signatures than for statewide offices. Id.

262. Id.
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achieving the state's goal of demonstrated electoral support in
263
each subdivision.
When the Court set out its analysis in Norman, it did not
explicitly state the separate parts of the Anderson balancing
test, but merely cited to the page of the Anderson opinion on
which the test appeared. 264 While Norman clearly established
that the Anderson balancing test was the first step in analyzing
ballot access restrictions, it was not clear if the Court intended
to apply all three parts of the test, or only the first part which
evaluated the burden on the infringed right. Norman clarified,
however, that when a severe burden was found, the analysis
proceeded under a strict standard of review. 265 Although the
Court did not expressly apply this analytical framework, it can
be concluded that the Court found a severe burden on the right
of association, thereby triggering strict scrutiny, since the Court
266
required that the law be narrowly tailored.
In the course of these cases, the Court developed and refined the analytical framework to be applied to First Amendment challenges to ballot access laws. These cases suggest that
the first part of the Anderson balancing test is a threshold inquiry. If a severe burden is found, the analysis does not continue under the Anderson balancing test, rather, strict scrutiny
is triggered. But, if the ballot access law poses only reasonable
restrictions on First Amendment rights, the analysis continues
under the Anderson balancing test.
2. Lower Court Applications of the Anderson Balancing
Test to Challenges of Write-In Voting Prohibitions
Although the Supreme Court did not directly address restrictions on write-in voting, other courts have applied the Anderson balancing test to challenges of state write-in voting
provisions. 267 In each case, the courts invalidated the statutes.
263. Id. at 708. The Court suggested the alternative of requiring a minimum
number of signatures from each subdivision while maintaining a total signature
requirement of 25,000. Id.
264. Id. at 705 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 708.
267. Dixon v. Maryland State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776, 780
(4th Cir. 1989) (stating that a "restriction could 'only survive constitutional scrutiny if it serve[d] a compelling governmental interest... and [was] narrowly tai-
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The courts found that the right to vote for the candidate of one's
choice was greatly burdened, 268 and that this infringement was
not outweighed by a sufficiently compelling state interest. 269

In Canaanv. Abdelnour,270 a San Diego ordinance banning
write-in voting was challenged in California state court.271 The
Supreme Court of California found that the substantial injury
to the right to vote for the candidate of one's choice 272 was not
outweighed by the city's interests in assuring that candidates
were qualified and willing to serve, fostering an educated electorate, and assuring the winner was the majority's choice.27 3
Moreover, the prohibition on write-in voting was not the least
restrictive alternative to meet the city's goals.2 7 4

In Paul v. Indiana Election Board,275 an Indiana election
law prohibiting all write-in voting was challenged in federal dis-

trict court. 276 The court reviewed the analysis used in Anderson

and Eu and concluded that "[t]he Anderson and Eu standards
govern[ed] . . . [their] analysis."277 The court found that the

right to vote for the candidate of one's choice was substantially
lored to serve that interest'.") (quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic
Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989) (alterations in original)); Paul v. Indiana
Election Bd., 743 F. Supp. 616, 622 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (applying the standards used
in Anderson and Eu); Canaan v. Abdelnour, 710 P.2d 268, 277 (Cal. 1985) (stating
that to justify burdening the right to vote, there must be "no less drastic alternatives"). It should be noted that Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992), had not
reached the Supreme Court at the time that these lower court cases were decided.
268. Dixon, 878 F.2d at 782-83 (finding that a refusal to report write-in votes
created an injury of great magnitude); Paul, 743 F. Supp. at 625-26 (finding an
extraordinary burden on the right to vote for the candidate of one's choice); Canaan, 710 P.2d at 277 (finding a substantial injury to the right to vote for the
candidate of one's choice).
269. Dixon, 878 F.2d at 786; Paul, 743 F. Supp. at 625; Canaan, 710 P.2d at
281.
270. 710 P.2d 268 (Cal. 1985).
271. Id. at 270. The local ordinance prohibited write-in votes at municipal
general elections, while state law permitted write-in voting in all elections. Id. at
269.
272. Id. at 277. The court noted that the ban "on write-in voting... prevents
voters from exercising 'the free and pure expression of [their] choice of candidates.'" Id. at 276 (quoting Gould v. Grubb, 536 P.2d 1337, 1348 (Cal. 1975)).
273. Id. at 278-79.
274. Id. at 281. The court did not articulate any alternative means to achieve
the city's interests.
275. 743 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
276. Id. at 619-20.
277. Id. at 622.
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burdened 27 8 and held that the state's "insufficient" interests in
fostering an informed electorate and preventing frivolous candidates did not justify the blanket prohibition of write-in
279
voting.
In Dixon v. Maryland Administrative Board of Election
Laws,280 a challenge to an election law reached the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. This law required non-indigent write-in candidates to pay a filing fee to be
designated as "official" write-in candidates and to have the
votes that were cast for them publicly reported. 28 ' The Fourth
Circuit also relied upon the Supreme Court's standards announced in Anderson and Eu.282 The circuit court identified the
right infringed upon as the right to cast an effective vote for the
candidate of one's choice. 28 3 The court found that the state's refusal to report write-in votes created an injury of great magni28 4
tude and undermined the right to vote.
Maryland asserted two interests to justify the filing fee requirement: defraying election costs and preventing frivolous
candidacies. 285 The Fourth Circuit held that the state's interests were insufficient to justify the serious infringement on
278. Id. at 625. The court stated that "the right to vote for the candidate of
one's choice, far from being a penumbral right, lies at the heart of the first amendment's protection." Id. at 623.
279. Id. at 624-25. The court also stated that the prohibition was "not narrowly tailored" because it banned all write-in voting. Id. at 625.
280. 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989).
281. Id. at 777. All write-in votes cast in an election were counted; however,
any write-in votes that were cast for an unofficial write-in candidate were not reported publicly. Id. at 784. The filing fee of $150 was mandatory unless a candidate could prove an inability to pay. Id. at 777-78.
282. Id. at 780. "[When] approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to
examine.., the extent and nature of their impact on voters." Id. at 779 (quoting
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)).
283. Id. at 781-82. The infringed right also included the right to express that
no candidate was acceptable. Id. at 782.
284. Id. This was the same as not allowing the voter to cast a ballot at all. Id.
at 782-83.
285. Id. at 783. The court found that although protecting the state's treasury
could be a legitimate interest, the state offered no evidence that the filing fee was
used to defray specific expenses associated with write-in candidates. Id. at 783-84.
Moreover, the fact that the state waived the filing fee for indigent candidates undermined the argument that the fee was associated with increased expenses resulting from allowing write-in candidates to enter an election. Id. Regarding the
state's interest in preventing frivolous or fraudulent candidates, the court recognized that a filing fee could not be used as the sole means of determining if a
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First Amendment rights.2 6 The court also found that there
were other means available to determine if a candidate was serious and, therefore, concluded that the filing fee for write-in
candidates was not sufficiently narrowly tailored. 2 7
In sum, two lower federal courts and a state supreme court
have held that a prohibition on write-in voting was invalid.
These cases identified the burdened right as the right to vote for
the candidate of one's choice, and found that the right was substantially burdened. 2 8 The courts concluded that the burden
on the right to vote was not outweighed by the state's interests
in protecting the integrity of the election process and fostering
an informed electorate. 28 9 A similar challenge to a write-in voting provision reached the United States Supreme Court in Burdick v. Takushi.290
III. Burdick v. Takushi
A.

The Facts

Alan Burdick, the petitioner, was a registered voter in Honolulu, Hawaii. 291 For several years, Burdick was unsatisfied
with the choice of candidates listed on the state-prepared elec-

tion ballot. 292 In 1986, Burdick wrote to state officials regarding

the state's policy on write-in voting and was advised that Hawaii election laws prohibited write-in votes. 293 Burdick filed
suit in federal district court and asserted that his inability to
cast a write-in vote prevented him from expressing his opposicandidate was serious. Id. at 784 (citing Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716
(1974)).
286. Id. at 786.
287. Id. at 784.
288. See supra note 268.
289. See supra note 269.
290. 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992).
291. Id. at 2061.
292. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992) (No.
91-535).
293. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2061. An opinion letter issued by the Attorney
General's Office in July 1986 indicated that Hawaii election laws did not contain
provisions to permit write-in voting. Petitioner's Brief at 4-5, Burdick v. Takushi,
112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992) (No. 91-535). Therefore, neither the legislature nor election
officials were constitutionally required to provide write-in voting. Id.
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tion to the single candidate from his district listed on the pri294
mary ballot for the State House of Representatives.
The election law at issue provided three methods for candidates to access the ballot. The first was the established party
route. 29 5 Under this method, a political party was exempt from
petition requirements if the party had demonstrated a history
of broad support 296 or if the party was a new party that qualified
through the petition process for the past three consecutive elections. 297 The second method was the new party petition route
whereby a group of people could qualify as a new political party
by filing the requisite nominating petition. 298 The final method
was the nonpartisan primary299 route whereby an independent
candidate could access the nonpartisan primary ballot by complying with certain nominating petition requirements.3 0 0 Independent candidates, as well as new party and established
party candidates, could be required to file nominating petitions
30
for the candidate's name to be printed on the ballot. '
The nominating petitions for state and federal offices required the signatures of twenty-five qualified voters30 2 and
nominating petitions for state legislative and county offices required the signatures of fifteen voters.3 0 3 There were no limitations on the number of nominating petitions that each voter
could sign for each office petitioned.3 0 4 These nominating petitions were required to be filed no later than sixty days prior to a
primary election.3 0 5
294. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2061.
295. HAw. REV. STAT. § 11-61(a) (Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-64 (1985).
296. HAw. REV. STAT. § 11-61(b) (Supp. 1992). In Hawaii, the Democratic, Republican, and Libertarian parties qualify as established parties for ballot access
under this provision. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2064.
297. HAw. REv. STAT. § 11-62(d) (Supp. 1992).
298. Id. § 11-62(a). To qualify as a new party, a group must submit a petition
containing the signatures of at least one percent of registered voters. Id. § 1162(a)(3).
299. Id. § 12-22, repealed by Act effective June 23, 1987, ch. 232, § 3, 1987
Haw. Sess. Laws 739, 740.
300. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2065; Respondents' Brief at 9 n.8, Burdick v.
Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992) (No. 91-535).
301. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2064.
302. HAw. REV. STAT. § 12-5(a) (Supp. 1992).
303. Id. § 12-5(b).
304. Id. § 12-4 (1985).
305. Id. § 12-6(a) (Supp. 1992).
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The Supreme Court of Hawaii had interpreted two sections
of the ballot access laws as prohibiting write-in voting. 30 6 One
provision required all candidates for elective offices to be nominated in accordance with the ballot access laws. 30 7 The other

required candidates who appeared on the general election ballot
to have been nominated in the preceding primary election.30 s
Although the election laws did not expressly forbid write-in voting, a write-in candidate's name could not be placed on the ballot, and therefore, votes could not be cast for a write-in
candidate. 30 9
B. ProceduralHistory
1.

The District Court

Burdick filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Hawaii challenging Hawaii's ban on write-in voting as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution. 310 Burdick filed a motion for summary judgment and permanent injunctive relief against the Director of Elections, 311 which was granted. 312 The court also
entered a preliminary injunction ordering the casting and
counting of write-in votes in the November 1986 general election. 313 The court denied the state's request for a stay of the
314
injunction pending appeal.
306. Burdick v. Takushi, 776 P.2d 824, 825 (Haw. 1989); see Jensen v. Turner,
40 Haw. 604, 613 (1954) (holding that the legislature intended to prohibit write-in
voting).
307. "All candidates for elective office, . . . shall be nominated in accordance
with [the ballot access laws] ... ." HAw. REV. STAT. § 12-1 (1985).
308. "No person shall be a candidate for any general or special general election unless the person has been nominated in the immediately preceding primary
or special primary." Id. § 12-2.
309. Burdick, 776 P.2d at 826.
310. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2061-62 (1992).
311. Burdick v. Takushi, 737 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D. Haw. 1990). The suit was
filed against Morris Takushi, Director of Elections, and the Lieutenant Governor
in his official capacity as the Chief Elections Officer. Id. at 582, 584. Defendants
hereinafter are referred to as the state.
312. The decision, order, and opinion of the district court is unreported. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992) (No. 91-535).
313. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2062.
314. Id.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stayed the district court's injunction and vacated its judgment under the Pullman abstention doctrine. 315 The court employed a three-part test 3 16 to
determine whether Pullman abstention was warranted. 3 17 The
court found that the election laws involved in this case were
"fairly subject to an interpretation"3 1 8 that could make adjudication of the constitutional question unnecessary. 31 9 Therefore,
the court of appeals remanded the case and ordered the district
court to abstain from further consideration until the Supreme
Court of Hawaii issued a definitive ruling on the state law as320
pects of the prohibition on write-in voting.
3. Remand to the District Court
On remand, the district court certified three questions to
the Supreme Court of Hawaii concerning the interpretation and
validity of the state's election laws. 321 The certified questions
were:
1. Does the Constitution of the State of Hawaii require Hawaii's
election officials to permit the casting of write-in votes and re315. Burdick v. Takushi, 846 F.2d 587, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Hawaii
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984) citing Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498, 501 (1941)). Federal courts should abstain from deciding a case when unsettled questions of state law must be decided before a federal
question can be decided. Id. at 588.
316. Id. The three-part abstention test applied by the Ninth Circuit from
Pullman is:
First, the proper resolution of the state law question at issue must be uncertain. Second, a definitive ruling on the state [law] issue must potentially
obviate the need for constitutional adjudication by a federal court. Third,
the complaint must touch upon "a sensitive area of social policy upon which
the federal courts ought not to enter unless [there is] no alternative . .. ."
Id. (quoting Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Summerland County
Water Dist., 767 F.2d 544, 546 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Canton v. Spokane Sch.
Dist. No. 81, 498 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1974)).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 589.
319. Id. A "definitive resolution" of the actual prohibition on write-in voting
could make the adjudication of the federal constitutional question unnecessary.
Id.

320. Id.
321. Burdick v. Takushi, 737 F. Supp. 582, 585 (D. Haw. 1990).
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quire Hawaii's election officials to count and publish write-in
votes?
2. Do Hawaii's election laws require election officials to permit
the casting of write-in votes and require Hawaii's election officials
to count and publish write-in votes?
3. Do Hawaii's election laws permit, but not require, Hawaii's
election officials to allow voters to cast write-in votes, and to count
322
and publish write-in votes?

The Supreme Court of Hawaii answered each of these questions
in the negative.3 23 The Hawaii court held that, under the state's
election laws, write-in votes could not be cast or counted in pri324
mary, general or special elections.
Based on the Hawaii court's interpretation of the election
laws, the district court applied the Anderson balancing test and
the Eu strict scrutiny approach. 325 The court stated that "[tihe
right to vote for the candidate of one's choice is a fundamental
right"326 and that Hawaii's election laws imposed a significant
burden on that right.3 27 The court then analyzed the interests
asserted by the state. 328 The state advanced interests in confining intraparty feuds, fostering an informed electorate, and protecting the primary mandate and finality of the electoral
process. 329 The court concluded that these interests were not
sufficiently compelling to justify the enormous burden on the
right to vote. 330 The district court held that the ban on write-in
voting severely burdened Burdick's rights and was not justified
322. Id.
323. Id.; see Burdick v. Takushi, 776 P.2d 824, 825 (Haw. 1989).
324. Burdick, 737 F. Supp. at 585; see Burdick, 776 P.2d at 825.
325. Burdick, 737 F. Supp. at 586-87 (applying Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460
U.S. 780, 789 (1983) and Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm.,
489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989)). The district court interpreted the Anderson balancing
test and the strict standard of review used in Eu as separate tests used by the
Supreme Court to evaluate challenges to ballot access laws. Id.
326. Burdick, 737 F. Supp. at 587. To support this position, the court determined that voting for the candidate of one's choice is the type of significant political expression that the First Amendment was designed to protect. Id.
327. Id. The court found that the ban on write-in voting directly burdened the
right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice by precluding that choice. Id.
328. Id. at 588-92.
329. Id. at 588.
330. Id. at 591-92.
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by a compelling state interest. 33 1 The court reluctantly granted
33 2
a stay of its injunction pending appeal.
4. Back to the Circuit Court
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the ruling of the district court. 333 The court of appeals also applied the Anderson
balancing test,334 but explained that the test did not require a
compelling state interest or narrowly tailored laws.3 3 5 The
court interpreted Anderson to merely require a showing that
the state's interests justified the burden. 336 Applying this test,
the circuit court found that the election laws did not place a
substantial burden on the fundamental right to participate
337
equally in an election.
The court stated that although the right to participate in an
election was a fundamental right, the right to vote for any candidate was not constitutionally protected. 338 The court further
found that two of the three interests advanced by the state were
compelling 33 9 and that the prohibition on write-in voting served
those interests.3 40 The circuit court held that although the pro331. Id. at 592. The district court granted Burdick's motion for summary
judgment and permanent injunctive relief. Id.
332. Id. at 593.
333. Burdick v. Takushi, 937 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1991).
334. Id. at 418.
335. Id. at 421.
336. Id. The circuit court did not provide a basis for this approach and did not
mention the strict standard of review used by the district court below or by the
Supreme Court in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee.
337. Id. at 419-20. Even if the circuit court had acknowledged the Supreme
Court's strict standard of review in Eu, it is likely that the court would have come
to the same result since it found an insubstantial burden such that strict scrutiny
would not have been triggered.
338. Id. at 420. Although the restrictions on write-in voting may impinge on
political speech, there were ample alternative channels available to Burdick to advance political views, therefore, any burdens on political speech were minimal. Id.
at 419. The court did not give examples of the alternative channels available to
Burdick.
339. Id. The state advanced the interests of political stability and "protecting
against 'sore losers' and party raiding," fostering an informed electorate, and
maintaining the internal structure of the election laws which permit automatic
seating of an unopposed primary election winner. Id. A "sore loser" candidate is
one who has lost at the primary election and seeks ballot status at the general
election. Id. at 420 n.4. The court found that fostering an informed electorate was
a legitimate interest. Id. at 420.
340. Id.
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hibition on write-in voting placed some restrictions on the
rights of expression and association, they were justified by the
specific interests advanced by the state.3 41
The Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Dixon 42 regarding write-in voting.3 43 The Ninth Circuit found that the Dixon court had focused on the right to influence the electoral process and did not appropriately distinguish
that right from the right to participate fully in an election. 3 "
Although the right to influence the outcome of an election may
be constitutionally protected, the Ninth Circuit found that a
prohibition on write-in voting would not substantially burden
that right since there were other means available for advancing
one's views. 345 The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari to resolve this disagreement in the circuits. 346
C.

Majority Opinion

The Court 347 began its analysis by describing the extent of a
state's authority to regulate elections and by noting that ballot
access regulations inevitably pose some burden on voters.3 48
The Court concluded that subjecting ballot access laws to strict
scrutiny when they placed any type of burden on the right to
vote would impose too great a hardship on legislatures seeking
to fairly regulate their elections. 349 The Court then fashioned
the standard of review to be applied in cases that challenge bal350
lot access laws.
341. Id.
342. See supra notes 280-87 and accompanying text.
343. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 421.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 415. The court found that Hawaii's election laws did not affect the
multitude of opportunities to communicate one's political views or to increase one's
influence. Id. at 421.
346. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 635 (1991).
347. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992). Justice White wrote the majority opinion joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas.
348. Id. at 2063. The Court has long recognized that a state retains the authority to regulate its own elections, and that "there must be substantial regulation" to ensure that elections are conducted fairly and honestly. Id. (quoting Storer
v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
349. Id. The majority rejected Burdick's contention "that a law that imposes
any burden upon the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny." Id. at 206263 (emphasis added).
350. Id. at 2063.
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Rather than use the strict standard of review advocated by
Burdick,3 51 the majority used the "more flexible standard" developed in Anderson.3 2 After laying out the Anderson balancing test, the Court stated that the level of their review would
depend upon the severity of the burden imposed on the protected rights.353 The Court explained that when the right at issue was severely infringed, the law must be narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest.3 54 But, when the law re-

sulted in only a reasonable burden on the right to vote, 3it55would
be sustained if justified by an important state interest.

Applying their interpretation of the Anderson balancing
test, the Court analyzed the nature of the right to vote and the
356
burden imposed on that right by prohibiting write-in voting.
Burdick asserted that the ban on write-in voting "deprive[d]
him of the opportunity to cast a meaningful ballot"35 7 thereby

infringing on his protected right to vote. Additionally, Burdick
contended that the ban impermissibly discriminated against
him "based on the content of the message"35 8 expressed through
3 59
his write-in vote.

The Court characterized Burdick's challenge as a request
for the state to record and to publish protest write-in votes
against the system or against nominated candidates.3 60 The
Court stated that there were other means available for a voter
to express his dissent and that the state was not required to
provide a forum, via elections, for voters to express their dissatisfaction with the system.36 1 The majority recognized voting as
a constitutional right, however, it stated that "the right to vote

351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 2063.
354. Id. (citing Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698, 705 (1992)).
355. Id. at 2063-64 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
356. Id. at 2062-66.
357. Id. at 2065.
358. Id.
359. Id. Burdick also asserted that he was constitutionally entitled to cast a
protest vote for Donald Duck. Id.
360. Id. at 2067.
361. Id.
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in any manner" was not absolute. 3 2 The Court emphasized
that the function of an election was to choose those who would
govern and not to provide a forum to express personal political
ideals. 363 The Court concluded that the right to vote was burdened to some extent by limiting the range of candidates from
3 64
which a voter could choose.
The Court next evaluated the extent of the burden in the
context of the total ballot access scheme. The Court reviewed
the three methods by which a candidate may appear on a primary ballot.365 Because of the overall ease of ballot access provided in the election laws, the Court concluded that the "burden
on voters' freedom of choice and association [was] borne only by
those who fail[ed] to identify their candidate of choice until days
before the primary [election]." 36 6 The majority reasoned that
Hawaii's ballot access scheme would not require the addition of
a write-in voting provision to remedy an otherwise unconstitutional law because it did not place an unreasonable burden on
the rights of voters. 367 The Court held that the nature of the
burden imposed by the prohibition of write-in voting was very
limited and not of constitutional significance because the laws
3 68
governing access to the ballot were liberal.
The Court considered the second part of the Anderson balancing test by evaluating the interests asserted by the state to
justify the ban on write-in voting. Since the burden imposed on
the voter's right was found to be slight, the Court did not require the state to establish a compelling interest. 369 The major362. Id. at 2063 (citing Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193
(1986)). The Court had already established that the difference between the rights
of voters and candidates are slight and not easily distinguishable. Id. at 2065-66.
363. Id. at 2066. "[T]he function of the election process is 'to winnow out and
finally reject all but the chosen candidates'...." Id. (citing Storer v. Brown, 415
U.S. 724, 730, 735 (1974)).
364. Id. at 2063.
365. See supra notes 295-305 and accompanying text.
366. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2065. As previously established, a candidate's interest to make a late decision to access an election ballot was given little weight.
Id. at 2065 (citing Storer, 415 U.S. at 736). A voter would only have to gather 15
signatures on a nominating petition to have a candidate placed on the election
ballot for state legislative and county races. Id. at 2064.
367. Id. at 2064-65. Burdick did not challenge the constitutionality of the
state's methods for accessing the ballot. Id. at 2065.
368. Id. at 2066.
369. Id.
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ity examined two interests asserted by the state: avoiding
unrestrained factionalism and preventing party raiding.370
The Court found that the state's interest in avoiding factionalism was adequately served by the ban because it prevented sore loser candidates 371 and ensured that the general
election would be reserved for major struggles rather than intraparty feuds. 372 The Court held that the interest in avoiding
factionalism justified the prohibition on write-in voting and was
a legitimate means of preventing sore loser candidates. 373 Further, the Court found that the prohibition on write-in voting
was necessary to achieve this state interest. 374
In evaluating the state's second interest, the Court found
that the ban on write-in voting successfully prevented party
raiding under the state's system of open primary elections.37 5
The Court found that party raiding could easily be accomplished at a primary election by writing in a candidate who did
not intend to seek nomination. 376 If Hawaii permitted write-in
voting, an organized write-in campaign could result in a primary winner who was not a member of that party. 377 The
Court held that preventing party raiding was a "legitimate interest" and that the prohibition on write-in voting was a reasonable means to achieve that interest. 378
The Court concluded that the state's legitimate interests
outweighed the limited burden placed on voters who could not
execute a write-in vote. 3 79 The Court's analysis culminated in
370. Id.
371. See supra note 339 for an explanation of sore loser candidates.
372. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2066. In addition, the ban served to focus the public's attention on "contested races in the general election" by allowing unopposed
candidates in the primary election to be designated as office holders prior to the
general election. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. An open primary election is held when a voter may vote in any primary without being a registered member of that party. Id.
376. Id. at 2067.
377. Id. at 2066-67. In addition, the Court found that a candidate who had
not won a nomination at a primary election could be written in at a general election. Id. at 2067. But see Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2072 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(stating that write-in candidates could file a declaration of candidacy to ensure
eligibility as a less restrictive alternative to meet the state's objective).
378. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2067.
379. Id.
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the holding that when ballot access laws were constitutional,
such that only reasonable burdens are placed on the right to
vote, a ban on write-in voting would be presumed valid.380 In
that context, the prohibition was presumptively valid since any
burden placed on the voter's rights would be reasonable and
would be justified by the same interests that justified the ballot
access laws. 38 ' Since Hawaii's ballot access laws provided con-

stitutionally sufficient access to the ballot, the addition of a prohibition of write-in voting imposed only a slight burden on a
voter's rights. 382 Furthermore, the slight burden on the right to
vote was justified by the state interests that justified the entire
3
ballot access scheme. 38
D. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennedy, writing for the dissent, 3 4 agreed with the
majority that the Anderson balancing test provided the appropriate analytical framework, 38 5 yet found a different result in its
application. Under the first part of the Anderson balancing
test, the dissent considered the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the protected rights. 386 In considering the
character of the injury, the dissent recognized the reality of the
Democratic Party's dominance in Hawaii and that Democratic
candidates often ran unopposed in statewide elections.387 They
stated that under these unusual circumstances, the voter could
either vote for the unopposed candidate or leave the ballot
blank. 388 Because Burdick could not write in a vote, the dissent

380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 2068 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.).
385. Id. at 2069-70.
386. Id. at 2068-69.
387. Id. at 2068. In the election that gave rise to this case, Burdick was given
only one choice on the ballot. Id. In state legislative elections held between 1982
and 1986, at least one-third of the candidates ran unopposed. Id. In 1990, over
one-quarter of the voters did not cast votes in the uncontested state legislature
races. Id. This led the dissent to conclude that some voters would have written in
a vote if given the opportunity. Id.
388. Id. at 2069.
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concluded that he had no means of casting a meaningful
3 89
ballot.
To determine the extent of this burden, the dissent evaluated the effect of the write-in voting restriction on a voter's ability to fully exercise the right to vote and found the result to be a
total deprivation of that right. 390 They considered the prohibition on write-in voting in isolation, however, rather than as a
single element in a larger ballot access scheme. 39 1 The dissent
found that the prohibition placed a significant burden on the
right of voters to select the candidate of their choice.3 92
The dissent took issue with the majority's view that the liberal nature of Hawaii's ballot access laws provided voters with
adequate choices on election day. 393 According to the dissent,
these very same ballot access laws actually limited a voter's
choices. 394 The dissenters also challenged the majority's presumption that a ban on write-in voting would be valid if the
ballot access laws themselves were constitutional. The dissent
argued that the majority did not consider the prohibition of
write-in voting as a factor in assessing the constitutionality of
the ballot access scheme. 395 They claimed that, under the majority's reasoning, a state would only have to defend a prohibition on write-in voting when it was a remedial measure to cure
an otherwise unconstitutional ballot access scheme.3 96 The dissent concluded that the majority's position disregarded the burden that the prohibition placed on a voter and that a ban
389. Id. at 2068.
390. Id. at 2070.
391. Id. at 2071.
392. Id. at 2068.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 2069. Hawaii's open primary system precluded voters from choosing a candidate from an established party if the voter chose to vote from the nonpartisan ballot. Id. Because there may not be independent candidates competing
for each office, there is no reason for a voter to chose the nonpartisan ballot. Id.
Moreover, write-in voting could be a "safety mechanism" if a new issue emerged
immediately prior to the election. Id. Under the current system, a voter would
have to vote for a candidate that was no longer favored, cast a blank ballot, or not
vote at all. Id. The dissent suggested that write-in voting would be a meaningful
alternative in this situation. Id.
395. Id. at 2070-71.
396. Id. at 2071.

45

994

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:949

"should not be presumed valid" without showing the precise in397
terest advanced by the restriction.
Under the second part of the Anderson balancing test, the
dissent did not specify the level of review used because "the
State has failed to justify the write-in ban under any level of
scrutiny."398 Just as they examined the write-in ban in isolation, the dissent would require the state to justify the ban on
399
write-in voting, rather than the entire ballot access law.

They found that the first interest advanced by the state focused
on preventing sore loser candidates in general elections in order
to protect the integrity of partisan primaries. 400 The dissent
concluded that a complete ban on write-in voting was not justified since a prohibition on write-in voting limited to general
elections would achieve the same purpose. 401 The interest in
preventing party raiding was similarly found not to be justified
by the ban since the system of open primaries actually facilitated party raiding. 40 2 Thus, the dissent held that the prohibition on write-in voting was unconstitutional because the
significant burden on the right to vote was not outweighed by
4
any interest advanced by the state. 03
IV. Analysis
Burdick v. Takushi continued the approach of applying the
Anderson balancing test to evaluate challenges to a state's ballot access laws, and clarified that the first part of the balancing
test was a threshold level of review that could trigger strict
scrutiny analysis. 40 4 The Anderson balancing test first considers the "character and magnitude" of the injury to a voter's
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. The interest in protecting the practice of allowing unopposed winners
of party primaries to be seated prior to the general election actually supported the
need to allow write-in votes since primary elections were often decisive. Id.
401. Id. The dissent, however, recognized that a ban on write-in voting at
general elections may be overinclusive since it would bar legitimate candidates
from seeking office. Id.
402. Id. at 2071-72.
403. Id. at 2072. The dissent noted that an additional interest of preventing
fraud and enforcing nomination requirements by prohibiting write-in voting was
not explained by the state at all. Id.
404. Id. at 2063-64.
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rights to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny. If strict
scrutiny was not triggered, the second part identifies, and evaluates, the interests advanced by the state to justify its ballot
access law. In balancing the injured party's rights against the
state's interest, the third part of the test considers the extent to
which it is necessary to burden the voter's rights to achieve the
405
state's interest.
Burdick presented the first opportunity for the Court to apply the Anderson balancing test, in its entirety, to uphold a
challenged law. In Burdick, both the majority and dissent
agreed that the Anderson balancing test provided the appropriate analytical framework to evaluate the challenged law, 406 yet
they reached different conclusions due to the manner in which
40 7
they determined the burden placed on the voter's rights.
The first part of the Anderson balancing test examines "the
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the [protected] rights ... ."408 In applying this portion of the test, the
majority evaluated the prohibition of write-in voting as one aspect of the entire election law. They found the burden on the
right to vote resulted from the limited range of candidates from
which a voter could choose. 40 9 To determine the magnitude of
this burden, the majority reviewed the methods by which a candidate could access the ballot. 4 10 The Court noted that independent candidates could be placed on the ballot by
41 1
submitting nominating petitions with only fifteen signatures.
Based on the ease of ballot access, the Court concluded that the
law did not present an unreasonable barrier to candidates and
therefore, placed only a limited burden on voters who could not
write-in a vote for the candidate of their choice. 412 The majority's reasoning implied that a disappointed voter could easily
petition to have his candidate of choice placed on the ballot and
thereby allow him to effectively exercise his right to vote for the
candidate of his choice.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

See supra notes 159-62 and text accompanying.
Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063-64, 2069-70.
Id. at 2067, 2072.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2063 (1992).
Id.; see also supra notes 295-305 and accompanying text.
See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2066.
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The majority focused on a voter's ability to exercise the
right to vote under the existing ballot access law, and found
only a slight infringement due to the ease of ballot access. 413
This indicated that placing the onus on a voter who favored a
particular candidate to gather fifteen signatures on a nominating petition, sixty days prior to the election, to have the candidate's name appear on the ballot would not result in a burden of
constitutional significance.
The dissent also evaluated the burden on the right to vote
for the candidate of one's choice. 414 The dissent, however, evaluated the singular aspect of the prohibition on write-in voting in
light of the reality of the partisan politics that existed in Hawaii. 415 The dissent considered statistics on voting practices in
prior elections and inferred that many voters had been unable
to fully exercise their right to vote. 416 Because of the Democratic Party's dominance in Hawaiian politics, the dissent found
that the inability to write-in a vote prevented a voter from casting a meaningful ballot and from fully exercising the fundamental right to vote. 417 The dissent characterized this burden on
418
the right to vote as significant.
In reaching their conclusion, the dissenters did not consider
the extent to which a voter could effectively participate in an
election under Hawaii's ballot access laws. Instead, they considered only the inability to write in a vote that would result in
a total deprivation of the right. 419 Because of this singular restriction in the ballot access law, the dissent's reasoning suggested that a prohibition on write-in voting would always
burden the right to vote regardless of the ease of ballot access.
Moreover, it is likely that the severe burden resulting from this
prohibition would not survive strict scrutiny analysis, and
therefore, would always be unconstitutional.
These modes of analysis of the ballot access law present the
fundamental difference between the majority's and dissent's
reasoning. The majority's reasoning indicates that a challenge
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.

Id. at 2064-66.
Id. at 2068-69 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2068.
See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2068 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2068-69.
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to a specific portion of an election law will be evaluated based
on the entire ballot access scheme. The dissent, however, examined only the impact of the single restriction without regard
to the rest of the ballot access provisions. The majority's evaluation of the burden on the right to vote, in light of its impact on
the electoral process and the entire ballot access scheme, was
more consistent with prior cases.
In Anderson, the Court evaluated the nominating petition
filing requirements for an independent candidate in the context
of the ballot access requirements for other types of candidates. 420 In Tashjian, the Court examined the impact of the restriction that a voter be registered with a political party, to
participate in that party's primary election, in light of the overall activities of the political party.421 Similarly, the Eu Court
examined the entire electoral process to determine that a prohibition on political endorsements by a political party impermissibly burdened the party's rights. 422 In Norman, the Court
considered the restrictions on a new party's access to the ballot
within the context of the other provisions of the state's ballot
access scheme rather than that singular requirement's burden
423
on a protected right.
The implications of these alternate methods of analysis are
demonstrated as the remainder of the Anderson balancing test
is applied. After the majority found a slight burden on the right
to vote, they continued with the second part of the Anderson
balancing test, rather than applying a strict standard of review. 4 24 Here, the Court found that the interests asserted by
the state were legitimate and outweighed any limited burden
imposed on voters because they could not write in a vote. 425 The
Court also considered the extent to which the prohibition on
write-in voting was necessary to achieve the state's interest and
concluded that the prohibition was a necessary component of
426
the ballot access scheme in order to achieve the state's goals.
420.
421.
422.
(1989).
423.
424.
425.
426.

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 792-93 (1983).
Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 215 (1986).
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223
Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698, 707 (1992).
Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2066.
Id. at 2066-67.
Id.
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This portion of the Court's reasoning suggests that because
write-in voting was not required to remedy an otherwise unconstitutional law, write-in voting could be constitutionally
prohibited.
This reasoning led the Court to hold that when ballot access laws are constitutional, such that only reasonable burdens
are placed on the right to vote, a ban on write-in voting will be
presumptively valid. In that context, any burden placed on the
voter's rights will be reasonable and will be justified by the
same interests that justified the ballot access laws. 427 Since Hawaii's ballot access laws were found to provide easy access to
the ballot, and were not unconstitutional, the burden was found
to be justified by the same state interests that justified the en428
tire ballot access scheme.
In contrast, when the dissent applied the second part of the
Anderson balancing test, they required the state to justify any
limitation on the right to vote independent of the justifications
for the entire ballot access law. 429 The dissent noted that there
were less restrictive alternatives that could have been used to
achieve the state's asserted interests. 4 0 This, coupled with the
finding of a significant burden, suggested that the dissent was
actually applying a strict standard of review.
The progression of these analyses turned on the manner in
which the burden on the right to vote was evaluated. The majority analyzed the ballot access laws as a whole and found a
limited burden, 431 while the dissent focused on the effect of the
prohibition and found a severe burden. 432 The principal point of
departure between the majority's and the dissent's analyses
was the context in which the burdened right was evaluated.
The majority focused on the extent to which a voter could still
participate in an election, even though he could not write in a
vote. The dissent focused on the inability of a voter to cast an
effective vote when he did not favor any of the candidates listed
on the ballot. Under the majority's reasoning, a voter must take
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.

Id. at 2067.
Id.
Id. at 2071 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2064-66.
Id. at 2070-71 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the initiative to have the candidate of his choice placed on the
ballot in order to fully realize his right to vote.
V. Burdick Applied
Burdick stands for the proposition that the constitutionality of a specific provision of a ballot access law will be evaluated
in the context of the total ballot access scheme. Under this
analysis, a restrictive provision may not render the law unconstitutional if the entire ballot access scheme does not impermissibly infringe on a voter's rights. Application of the reasoning
used by the Burdick Court suggests that New York's ballot access laws would not withstand a constitutional challenge if the
state were to prohibit write-in voting. This analysis focuses on
the law governing access to the ballot for the New York State
Assembly since that is equivalent to the election that gave rise
to Burdick.
Under the first part of the Anderson balancing test, the entire ballot access scheme for New York State Assembly elections
is evaluated. Political party candidates must file a designating
petition 433 signed by the lesser of five percent or 500 of the voters enrolled in the party who reside in that assembly district. 434
The voters signing the petition must be enrolled members of the
candidate's political party, and their signatures must be witnessed or notarized. 435 In addition, the completed designating
petition must be filed nine weeks prior to the primary election 436 and signatures cannot be obtained more than thirty437
seven days prior to filing the petition.
For independent candidates seeking ballot status at a general election, nominating petitions must contain signatures totalling the lesser of five per cent of the votes cast for governor
by voters of that assembly district at the preceding election or
1500.438 In addition, all signatures on the nominating petition
must be witnessed or notarized. 439 A voter who signs this peti433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.

N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-118 (McKinney 1978).
Id. § 6-136(2)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
Id. § 6-132 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1993).
Id. § 6-158(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
Id. § 6-134(6).
Id. § 6-142(2)(g).
Id. § 6-140 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1993).
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tion cannot vote in the primary election for that office, or sign
the nominating petition of any other candidate running for the
same office. 40 Nominating petitions for independent candidates must be filed between eleven and twelve weeks prior to
the general election" 1 and signatures cannot have been obtained more that six weeks prior to filing." 2
Under New York's ballot access laws, petition requirements
for political party candidates differ from those for independent
candidates. The most stringent requirement imposed on candidates for New York State Assembly is the number of signatures
that must be obtained on a designating or a nominating petition
within a specified time frame. Political party candidates must
gather 500 signatures within a thirty-seven day time period
prior to filing. Simple division reveals that an average of fourteen signatures per day must be obtained on a political party
candidate's nominating petition to satisfy the signature requirements. An independent candidate, however, must obtain 1500
signatures in a forty-two day period prior to filing. Therefore,
an independent candidate seeking the same office must obtain
an average of thirty-six signatures per day to satisfy the signature requirement.
The restrictions on the qualifications of voters who can sign
each type of petition also impacts on the signature gathering
process. Political party candidates can solicit any member of
their party to sign a designating petition, whereas independent
candidates can only obtain valid signatures from voters who
will not vote in a primary election. These requirements result
in an independent candidate having a dramatically limited pool
of potential voters from which to obtain signatures. Since signatures on a nominating petition must be obtained over a
month prior to a primary election, it is likely that enrolled members of a political party would refrain from signing the nominating petition for an independent candidate in the expectation
that they would participate in their party's primary election.
Moreover, if an independent candidate is from a district with a
high percentage of voters who are enrolled in a political party,
the pool of potential signers would be further limited.
440. Id. § 6-138(1) (McKinney 1978).
441. Id. § 6-158(9) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
442. Id. § 6-138(4) (McKinney 1978).
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An additional factor is the filing time frame for an independent candidate to obtain ballot status at a general election. The time frames make it likely that a nominating petition
for an independent candidate would be filed a month prior to
the primary election.443 Under these circumstances, an independent candidate may be in a position of gathering supporters before the issues have been solidified or the strongest
political party candidates have emerged. 444
In Burdick, only fifteen signatures were required on a nominating petition for a state legislative race, and there were no
restrictions on the voters who could sign the petition.445 There,
a voter could easily file a petition to place the candidate of his
choice on the ballot and thereby further his ability to vote for
that candidate. The Burdick Court concluded that the lack of
write-in voting did impinge on a voter's rights, yet the ease of
ballot access reduced the significance of that burden.446 In New
York, a voter must obtain 500 or 1500 signatures to have his
candidate of choice placed on the ballot. Similar to Burdick, a
ban on write-in voting would infringe on a New Yorker's ability
to select the candidate of his choice. The more stringent signature requirements, however, as well as the limitations on voters
who could sign a petition, suggest that the burden in New York
447
would be more than slight.
Under the second part of the Anderson balancing test, the
interests advanced by the state to justify the ballot access laws
are examined. New York has asserted three interests to justify
its ballot access laws. The first interest is "requiring candidates
to demonstrate a significant level of public support. . ."448 The
Supreme Court has held that requiring candidates to show a
"significant modicum of public support" is a compelling state interest. 449 The other asserted interests are ensuring that elec443. For example, if the primary election is held on September 14, the
designating petition for a party candidate must be filed between July 12 and 15
and if the general election is held on November 4, the nominating petition for an
independent candidate must be filed between August 12 and 19.
444. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 790-92 (1983).
445. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2064 (1992).
446. Id. at 2066.
447. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792-93.
448. Katherine E. Schuelke, Note, A Call for Reform of New York State's Ballot Access Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 182, 215 (1989).
449. See supra note 60.
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tions are conducted fairly and honestly, and maintaining the
efficiency of the electoral process. 45 0 These interests are implicated under the more general interest of protecting the integrity
of the electoral process. The Court has found this to be an important and legitimate state interest. 45 1 Since the interests advanced by New York are legitimate or compelling, the third part
of the Anderson balancing test is applied whereby the extent to
which the state's interests make it necessary to burden the
voter's right is considered.
Presumably, the interests advanced by the state to justify
the ballot access laws apply equally to party and independent
candidates, yet the petition requirements for independent candidates are more demanding. Because political party candidates are not required to obtain more than 500 signatures to
sufficiently meet the state's interests, it appears unreasonable
to require that an independent candidate obtain 1500 signatures to achieve the same interests. Therefore, the stringent
petition requirements for independent candidates are not necessary to achieve the state's interests and fail under the third part
of the Anderson balancing test. This analysis demonstrates
that a challenge to a prohibition on write-in voting in New York
would find the prohibition unconstitutional in light of the stringent petition requirements in the ballot access laws and resulting burden on the right to vote.
VI.

Conclusion

Challenges to write-in voting, like challenges to any law
that regulates ballot access, are evaluated using the Anderson
balancing test. Burdick v. Takushi stands for the proposition
that the constitutionality of a particular provision of a state's
ballot access law will be evaluated in the context of the total
ballot access scheme. Under this reasoning, states can justify a
prohibition on write-in voting that poses a slight infringement
on the exercise of the right to vote, within the context of the
larger ballot access scheme, by merely advancing a legitimate
interest.
Jacqueline Ricciani
450. See Schuelke, supra note 448, at 215.
451. See supra note 57.
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